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II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The order granting summary disposition should be vacated because the
court’s finding that the evidence was not exculpatory or material under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is not supported by any evidence in the record.  The
state’s alternative bases for affirmance are either without merit, or should not be
considered for the first time on appeal, or both. 
A.  Remand is required because the district court’s resolution of the
Brady claim is based on evidence outside of the record.
In the Supplemental Opening Brief, Mr. Tapp argued that the district court’s
finding that the withheld evidence was not exculpatory or material under Brady v.
Maryland, supra, was not supported by sufficient evidence in the record because the
transcript of the criminal trial was not taken judicial notice of, was not introduced
as an exhibit, and was not filed, either by Mr. Tapp or with the state’s answer.  In
support of that argument, Mr. Tapp referred the Court to Matthews v. State, 122
Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215, 1222 (1992), where the Supreme Court held “that
prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the district court is required
to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is necessary to a determination . . .
that there are no material issues of fact and that the petitioner is not entitled to
post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19–4906(b).”  The state, however, does not cite or
attempt to distinguish Matthews from this case.  As Matthews has never been
  While a “judge may take judicial notice of personal recollection of prior1
proceedings to the extent that the judge recalls what occurred,” the prior
proceedings must be from the same case and a transcript of the prior proceeding
must be available so any error is subject to appellate review.  Navarro v. Yonkers,
144 Idaho 882, 887, 173 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2007) (emphasis added), citing Matthews,
supra.  Here, the matter “recollected” by the district court judge was a trial which
he did not preside over and, since judicial notice was not taken, the trial transcripts
are not available for this Court to review.  However, had the district court or this
Court taken judicial notice, the trial transcripts would have shown the district
court’s finding was in error.  See, Opening Brief, p. 10-23.  
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overruled or called into question , its holding should be applied in this case.1
The state argues that Mr. Tapp’s citation to Matthews is simply an attempt to
avoid the defects in his pleadings.  Yet, at the same time, it concedes that it also had
a statutory duty to provide the transcripts missing from Mr. Tapp’s petition.  State’s
Brief, pg. 20.  The district court also had the duty to obtain the portion of the trial
transcript needed to determine the state’s motion under Matthews.  Thus, while all
parties share in the blame for an inadequate record, the fact remains that the
record is inadequate and thus does not support the district court’s finding that the
withheld evidence was not exculpatory or material under Brady.  
The state’s citation to Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902
(Ct. App. 1994), does not aid its cause.  While it is true that the Court of Appeals
stated that the petitioner had the burden of placing a transcript into evidence after
the state had moved for summary dismissal, the petitioner in Matthews was also
faced with defending a motion for summary disposition but the Supreme Court
required the district court to obtain the transcript before ruling.  Since Roman is
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inconsistent with Matthews, the Supreme Court case must be followed.  And the
general rule is that the moving party bears the burden of production in motions for
summary judgment.  See, Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 388,
210 P.3d 63, 73 (2009) (District court improperly placed the burden of production on
non-moving party to show that the customary rate of pay.); Chandler v. Hayden,
147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 485, 489 (2009) (“The moving party bears the burden
of proving the absence of material facts.”); Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134
Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000) (“The party moving for summary
judgment initially carries the burden to establish there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).  In this
regard, it is important to note that the state did not argue that Mr. Tapp had failed
to prove the evidence was not exculpatory or material, it affirmatively argued that
the evidence was neither exculpatory nor material.  R 35.  Thus, it should have
provided the transcripts needed to support its argument.
Remand is required because there is no way for this Court to determine
whether the district court’s ruling that the evidence was not exculpatory or material
under Brady was correct. 
B.  The state’s alternative arguments should not be considered for the
first time on appeal and/or are without merit. 
The state argued in the district court that the evidence was not exculpatory
because “[t]estimony regarding another possible suspect does not exculpate or
impeach Mr. Tapp’s confession.”  R 32.  Second, it argued that the evidence was not
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suppressed because “defense counsel knew or should have known about Smith’s
involvement because that information was present in the police reports of which
they had access.”  R 33.   Finally, it argued that the evidence presented by Mr. Tapp
was not material because Mr. Smith was not the contributor of the semen recovered
at the crime scene and “[e]ven if Jeff Smith was involved in some other way with
Angie Dodge’s rape and murder, his involvement does not affect Petitioner’s guilt
nor negate his confession.”  R 35.
The state now makes several alternative arguments to support the district
court’s ruling.  State’s Brief, pg. 15-18.  However, since these arguments differ from
those made by the state in the district court, they should not be considered for the
first time on appeal.  To do so would deprive Mr. Tapp of his due process right to
notice and a full and fair opportunity to respond.  Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233,
239, 358 P.3d 794, 800 (Ct. App. 2015). (The Court declined to affirm a summary
dismissal based upon an argument raised by the state for the first time on appeal,
noting that “were we to affirm the grant of summary dismissal on this alternative
basis, it would be tantamount to the district court granting summary dismissal on a
basis not identified in the state’s motion for summary dismissal without the twenty
days’ notice provided for in I.C. § 19–4906(b).”).  Further, the arguments are
without merit.
First, the state argues that Mr. Tapp did not show that either Mr. Browning
or Ms. Goff had exculpatory information because there is no connection between the
  The state also argues that Mr. Browning’s and Ms. Goff’s observation of Mr.2
Smith at 3:00 a.m. on June 13, 1996, was not connected in time to the murder since 
Mr. Tapp’s pleadings never alleged when Ms. Dodge was murdered.  State’s Brief, p.
14-15.  The state, however, overlooks the fact that it filed discovery documents from
the criminal case which establish the time and date of the murder as sometime after
midnight on June 13, 1996.  R 45. 
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encounter described in the affidavits and the Angie Dodge murder.  State’s Brief, p.
14-15.  This is a different argument than the one the state made below, i.e., that the
evidence was not exculpatory in light of Mr. Tapp’s (false) confession that he was an
accomplice.  Thus, the argument should not be considered.  Caldwell v. State, supra.
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Smith did not confess to killing Angie Dodge does
not deprive the evidence of exculpatory value.  The facts that Mr. Smith 1) showed
up at 3:00 a.m., 2) wearing a bloody shirt, 3) with scratches on his face and 4) a rug
burn on his chin, 5) asking to use Mr. Browning’s bathroom to wash up exculpates
Mr. Tapp even absent an admission to the murder.  This is so because there is no
evidence linking Mr. Smith to Mr. Tapp.  If Mr. Smith is the murderer, Mr. Tapp
could not have been his accomplice.  It is of no moment that Mr. Smith was not the
donor of the semen found at the crime scene, neither was Mr. Tapp.  Thus, the
evidence shows that Mr. Smith was involved in the murder and was the accomplice
to the rape in place of Mr. Tapp.2
Second, the state argues that Mr. Tapp did not show that the state “withheld
Browning or Goff as potential witnesses.”  State’s Brief p. 16.  However, the district
court rejected the state’s argument that it did not withhold evidence about Mr.
Smith at the summary disposition hearing. Tr., p. 66, ln. 24-25.  Moreover, the state
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never claimed below that it turned over information about Mr. Browning or Ms.
Goff.   It only claimed that defense counsel knew or should have known that Mr.
Smith was a suspect, not that it turned over evidence that he was seen bloody and
injured shortly after the time of the murder.  R 33. The documents provided by the
state in support of its motion show that Mr. Smith was considered a suspect in the
murder, but there is no mention of the incident witnessed by Mr. Browning and Ms.
Goff.  See R 38-154 (Discovery documents attached as Exhibits B-D to the state’s
Memorandum in Support of Summary Dismissal).  Moreover, the state’s speculation
that the detective Mr. Browning spoke to might not have passed on the information
to the case agents handling the investigation of the brutal murder and rape of an
18-year-old woman is far-fetched, at best. 
Finally, the state argues that Mr. Tapp failed to allege facts raising a genuine
issue of fact with respect to prejudice.  State’s Brief, p. 17.  This argument should
also not be considered because it is different from the argument below which was
that the evidence was not exculpatory in light of Mr. Tapp’s defense at trial.  R 45. 
In any case, the state failed to file the trial transcripts in support of its motion and
thus failed to carry its burden as the moving party to show the absence of a genuine
question of material fact.    
III.  CONCLUSION  
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the district
court’s summary dismissal of the second successive petition and remand for further
proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this 26  day of October, 2016.th
/s/Dennis Benjamin                        
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Christopher Tapp
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